Origami Finance

Orange · 58/100 Data confidence 83/100

Missing critical evidence: legal. The score is capped until coverage improves.

Executive summary

Executive summary is being prepared.

Score

Component Weight Raw Points Reason
security 25% 100 25.0 6 audit(s); fresh audit bonus; active bug bounty bonus
incidents 25% 15 3.8 1 incident(s) in 730-day window, losses $0; 0 high/critical news
verifiability 15% 78 11.7 0 onchain, 16 two-source, 7 one-source of 25 fact(s)
stability 15% 50 7.5 stability not established; 0 current depeg event(s)
adoption 10% 50 5.0 TVL bucket 7; neutral context, not a safety signal
governance 10% 50 5.0 timelock in governance +15; no legal signals

Identification

protocol identification

two sources

Origami Finance is a multi-chain automated leverage / yield protocol with one-click leveraged vaults on Ethereum, Berachain and Plasma. ### Protocol Identification

  • Name: Origami Finance
  • Website: origami.finance (from multiple independent aggregators and docs; unverified marketing claim)
  • Docs: docs.origami.finance
  • Category: Automated leverage / yield protocol & leveraged farming vaults, offering folded exposure to yield-bearing tokens (YBTs) via ov/lov/OPAL vaults.
  • Chains:
  • Ethereum: majority of TVL (~97%).
  • Berachain: minority share (~2–3%).
  • Plasma: small share (~0.1%).
  • Launch timing: v1 vaults launched in 2023 for GMX/GLP per GitHub project history.
  • Native token: No clear, consistently identified fungible governance token; products are vault tokens (ovToken, lovToken, OPAL) representing leveraged positions, not obviously a single native protocol token. Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. ### Main Contracts / Addresses
  • Docs list technical-reference contracts for Ethereum and Berachain, plus legacy contracts (e.g. an address 0xe488A... as a legacy contract).
  • Aggregators (DefiLlama, MrDeFi, DefiCare, DappDeFi) track Origami positions and TVL but do not consistently surface canonical core-contract addresses in a way that can be cross-checked with explorers within this environment.
  • Without direct explorer inspection, main contract addresses and explorer verification status are: Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. ### Fork Lineage
  • GitHub and docs describe Origami as a bespoke leveraged vault system sourcing liquidity from external money markets (Spark, Aave V3, Morpho, Euler, etc.), rather than a direct fork of a single upstream protocol.
  • Public materials do not state it as an explicit fork of major protocols like Aave, Morpho, or Gearbox; instead it integrates with them for collateralized loans and folding.
  • Therefore, whether it is a strict fork vs. entirely original contracts is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.
  • No independently documented malicious-modification incidents in forks of Origami or Origami-derived forks were found in risk reviews and media summaries. Absence of evidence is not proof of absence.
  • Audit status and whether any changes vs. potential upstream codebases have been audited cannot be confirmed from independent auditor sites in the retrieved data: Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.
Evidence (11)

maturity

two sources

Origami Finance appears to have a real product site and live documentation, not just a landing page. The docs describe a clickable dApp flow, including connected-wallet deposits into vaults, and the official docs repeatedly point users to origami.finance for the dApp. A GitHub README also lists separate website and dApp entry points, which supports that this is a working protocol UI rather than a pure marketing page. The site copy says vaults run on Ethereum mainnet and Base, while third-party protocol pages show Origami as deployed across Berachain, Ethereum, and Plasma; that chain mix should be treated cautiously because chain coverage is inconsistent across sources and cannot be on-chain verified here. The site and docs do not provide enough evidence to confirm live deposits/withdrawals, broken-link rates, or whether any metrics are fake; those points are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. Documentation quality looks above-template: there is a structured docs site with versioned pages, markdown mirrors, contracts references, and a docs index/llms.txt pattern. That said, the docs themselves expose some automation features and API-style endpoints for documentation queries, but those are for the docs system, not proof of a public protocol API. On the specific API question, an API documentation page exists for “Origami API,” but the accessible snippet looks like a generic app/API reference and does not clearly establish a public, open protocol API for third-party integrators. Open API status is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.

Evidence (7)

Security

audit

one source

Electisec audit dated 2025-07-14 to 2025-07-15 for the CowSwapper contract. The snippet states 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 0 low, and 3 informational findings, with the informational items either acknowledged or addressed by the Origami team. Whether this report covers the currently deployed Berachain/Ethereum/Plasma code is not verifiable from the snippet alone, and the Bytecode-match note must be checked separately. Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.

Auditor
Electisec
Report Date
2025-07-14
Scope
CowSwapper contract
Evidence (1)

audit

one source

Guardefy/Pavel Anokhin audit dated 2025-11-17 to 2025-12-02 for the OPAL Vault code. The snippet reports 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 3 low, and 1 informational finding, and says all low-severity and informational findings were reviewed and confirmed fixed. Deployed-code coverage and any Bytecode-match conclusion are not verifiable from the available snippet. Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.

Auditor
Guardefy / Pavel Anokhin
Report Date
2025-11-17
Scope
OPAL Vault
Evidence (1)

audit

one source

Jacopod audit dated 2025-12-02 to 2026-01-29 for the OPAL contracts. The snippet reports 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 0 low, and 1 informational finding; it also says the informational issue was acknowledged by the team without requiring a code change. Deployed-code coverage and Bytecode-match status are not verifiable from the available snippet. Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.

Auditor
Jacopod Audits
Report Date
2025-12-02
Scope
OPAL contracts
Evidence (1)

audit

one source

Panprog/Guardefy audit dated 2025-11-05 to 2025-11-11 for the bundler contracts. The snippet reports 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 2 low, and 4 informational findings, and says all low-severity findings were fixed during the review cycle. Deployed-code coverage and the Bytecode-match note are not verifiable from the available snippet. Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.

Auditor
Panprog (Pavel Anokhin / Guardefy)
Report Date
2025-11-05
Scope
Bundler contracts
Evidence (1)

audit

two sources

Origami Finance v1 audit (Feb 2023), scope not fully recoverable from the provided search results; DefiCare and the Origami docs indicate this is the v1 audit and that it predates later upgrades. Findings/severity breakdown, fix status, and whether the report explicitly covers currently deployed code are not fully verifiable from the available results; if the deployed code differs from audited bytecode, the Bytecode-match note must be checked separately. Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.

Auditor
yAudit
Report Date
2023-02
Scope
Origami Finance v1
Evidence (3)

audit

two sources

Origami Finance v2 audit (Feb 2024) is referenced by the protocol docs, with the auditor and date visible; however, the full report contents, exact scope, and all findings/severity details are not recoverable from the provided snippets alone. Fix status and deployed-code coverage are therefore not verifiable here, including any Bytecode-match determination. Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.

Auditor
Zellic
Report Date
2024-02
Scope
Origami Finance v2
Evidence (3)

bug bounty

two sources

Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29 whether Origami Finance currently has an active bug bounty program. The strongest directly relevant evidence is a Hats Finance audit competition for Origami Finance that ran from 2024-02-22 15:00 GMT to 2024-03-07 15:00 GMT, with a prize pool of about $50K USDC, NFT rewards, a 20% HATS service fee, and a rule that the first valid submitter gets the bounty for that issue; known or out-of-scope issues were excluded. A separate Hats Finance post says Origami “launched a bug bounty” on Hats with 90k DAI, a 30-day vested period for 54% of rewards and immediate release for the remaining 36%, but it does not provide a clear start date or confirm that the program is still active today. The search results also include an Aurigami bug-bounty page, which appears to be a different protocol and is not reliable evidence for Origami Finance. No result in the provided set shows disclosed results such as total submissions paid, number of findings, or whether the program remains open.

Evidence (3)

crypto custody

two sources

Origami Finance is organized as a non-custodial DeFi protocol: users connect a Web3 wallet, deposit assets into vault smart contracts, and receive an ERC-20 receipt token representing their position; the protocol then manages looping, rebalancing, and compounding automatically via smart contracts rather than a human custodian. The available documentation also states that there is “no custodial risk” and “no off-chain black boxes,” which indicates that asset control is intended to remain on-chain in user-interacted contracts rather than with an external custody provider. Based on the available sources, the custody model is best described as self-custody / smart-contract custody for the user, with protocol-level automation handling execution. For the requested chains, the docs indicate the protocol operates on Ethereum and Berachain; a distinct custody arrangement for Plasma is not verifiable as of 2026-08-29 from the available sources.

Evidence (4)

incident

unverified

Origami Finance has one clearly documented incident in the provided sources: an iBGT Vault reward incident tied to a v1.8 upgrade bug that changed reward emissions from a 24-hour cycle to a 1-hour cycle, causing rewards to be over-distributed at 24x the correct rate for several hours. The protocol said no user funds were lost or at risk, and it responded by airdropping 4,962.49 iBGT to 427 eligible users and sending the deficit directly to Origami and Pendle so users were made whole; operations were restored after the fix.

Date
2026-09-21
Cause
smart_contract_exploit
Loss Usd
None
Evidence (1)

key management

two sources

Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. The available results about “Origami” mostly refer to unrelated entities (Origami Risk, Origami Tech, Origami.ms, Origami Capital), while the only result that appears to match Origami Finance is its documentation page, which describes the protocol’s leverage/vault design but does not provide any verifiable information on key management or signer/treasury-control organization. Because no source in the provided results identifies the protocol’s operational key custody model, multisig setup, admin roles, upgrade keys, or chain-specific governance for Berachain, Ethereum, or Plasma, any answer beyond this would be speculation.

Evidence (2)

Live security feed

No verified protocol news in the last 12 months.

Team & Reputation

founders

two sources

Origami Finance appears to be a TempleDAO-incubated, Berachain-native leveraged yield protocol with a small, largely pseudonymous founding team, offshore legal entities, and credible but crypto-native backers. Founders & team identity

  • Public information consistently refers to “Lux” as a co-founder of Origami Finance; they are active in fundraising communications but use a pseudonym and no clear legal name or LinkedIn-style profile is disclosed.
  • RootData lists another co‑founder “miri” (pseudonymous) and notes the project was founded in 2022.
  • Origami is explicitly described as a TempleDAO-incubated project, indicating close ties to the TempleDAO ecosystem and its contributors rather than a fully independent, doxxed startup team.
  • No verifiable evidence of fully doxxed C‑level executives (CEO/CTO) or a formal board with real‑name bios is available in public docs or major data aggregators. This suggests a primarily pseudonymous team. Prior projects / outcomes / hacks
  • The project is closely associated with TempleDAO, which suffered a smart‑contract exploit in October 2022; that incident is a relevant part of the ecosystem’s risk history, though it is not clearly attributed to Origami’s own contracts.
  • There is no public record in the sources consulted of Origami itself being hacked or exploited as of the latest updates.
  • Investors include Ouroboros Capital, Fjord Foundry, Upside DAO, TempleDAO, BeraLand, Aquanow and several well‑known DeFi angels such as DCF God, DeFi Ted, Steve Bearwin, Noral & Polar (Ramen Finance), Oleg Giberstein (Coinrule), Atka co‑founders, which signals that experienced crypto participants have diligenced and backed the project, albeit within a highly crypto‑native circle. Public vs anon; jurisdiction; real business vs shell
  • DefiCare reports that the operating entity is Veltrix LLC, a limited liability company incorporated in the Republic of Panama, which operates the site and services.
  • An affiliated Origami Foundation is referenced as a Cayman Islands entity supporting the ecosystem but not directly operating the app.
  • These jurisdictions (Panama LLC + Cayman foundation) indicate an offshore, crypto-native legal setup, common in DeFi but generally not equivalent to a regulated, onshore financial institution.
  • No evidence of a disclosed physical office location, audited financial statements, or traditional regulatory licenses was found in public sources; this leans toward “webfront + offshore entities” rather than a conventional, onshore operating company. Reality check / credibility
  • Pros:
  • Backed by multiple recognizable DeFi investors and incubated by an established ecosystem (TempleDAO/Berachain).
  • Listed on major analytics platforms (DefiLlama, DeFiCare, DefiSentinel, MrDeFi), suggesting sustained on‑chain activity and external monitoring.
  • Cons / flags:
  • Core team remains largely pseudonymous, with limited verifiable real‑world identities.
  • Offshore entity structure (Panama/Cayman), with no clear real‑world office footprint.
  • Ecosystem link to TempleDAO, which has prior exploit history, increases the need for heightened smart‑contract and operational risk scrutiny. Given these factors, Origami Finance looks like a serious but strongly crypto‑native / offshore DeFi venture, not a fully institutional, onshore financial services company. Detailed on‑chain or corporate verification is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29 beyond the cited public data.
Evidence (13)

general reputation

two sources

Origami Finance currently has a generally positive but still emerging reputation, with credible backers and no public records of fraud, rug-pull, sanctions, or insolvency issues as of 2026-08-29. ### Team, incubation, and investors

  • Origami is described as a TempleDAO-incubated project, aiming to make on-chain leveraged positions safer and more accessible. TempleDAO is a known DeFi collective, which supports the “leveraged yield” narrative but also attaches Origami to Temple’s own risk/reputation history.
  • CB Insights lists Origami Finance as a company focused on automated leverage within blockchain/DeFi, based in Delaware, USA, which suggests some level of corporate structuring rather than an entirely anonymous launch.
  • A fundraising announcement reports a $1.5M seed round, with participation from multiple named funds and individuals (e.g., Ouroboros Capital, Fjord Foundry, BeraLand, TempleDAO, Upside DAO, various DeFi figures), indicating reasonably strong ecosystem backing. ### Protocol positioning and ecosystem sentiment
  • Multiple analytics/overview sites describe Origami as an automated leverage / leveraged farming protocol on Ethereum, Berachain and Plasma, focused on yield-bearing tokens and one‑click leverage.
  • Narrative across independent data sites is consistent: Origami provides “folded” leveraged positions on YBTs/LSTs/LRTs with auto‑rebalancing and governance‑set risk parameters, aligning with a sophisticated but high‑risk product class.
  • Sentiment in ecosystem write‑ups (e.g., Berachain/Infrared ecosystem articles and partner docs) is supportive/neutral, framing Origami as a composable leverage primitive and partner vault provider, not as controversial. ### Audits, bug bounties, and security reputation
  • Public web data for this run did not surface a clearly independent audit report (e.g., from a major auditing firm) or dedicated bug bounty program pages tied directly to Origami.
  • Under the given methodology, audit status is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. ### Incidents, criticisms, and regulatory/sanctions checks
  • No search results indicated:
  • Rug-pull or exit-scam allegations.
  • Insolvency or major loss events.
  • Formal fraud accusations.
  • Regulatory actions or inclusion on sanctions lists.
  • Large-scale public controversies.
  • Given the leverage-focused design, independent reviewers emphasize liquidation and strategy risk rather than governance or integrity concerns, positioning risk as technical/market rather than reputational. ### Unresolved concerns / analytical flags
  • On-chain verification gaps: detailed holder distribution, treasury balances, and incident logs are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.
  • Lack of easily-found audits and formal bug bounty information is a material due‑diligence gap for an institutional profile.
  • Close association with TempleDAO and Berachain ecosystem concentrates correlation risk: adverse events in those projects could transmit reputational and liquidity stress to Origami.
Evidence (15)

Economy

TVL: $46.6M

model

one source

Based on available independent data, Origami Finance appears to be a relatively small, yield‑oriented DeFi protocol with limited third‑party analytics coverage and almost no reliable, chain‑wide economic metrics. Most of what follows is therefore *incomplete*; any figures not explicitly sourced from major analytics platforms are Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑29. ### 1. Strategy & assets

  • Public information indicates Origami Finance focuses on yield strategies around liquid staking / LSD‑like assets and stablecoins, offering vault‑style products on Ethereum and newer L2 / alt‑L1s. This includes market‑making or lending‑style strategies and occasionally points / incentive farming on integrated protocols.
  • Concrete, chain‑wide breakdown of assets in/out by vault or chain is Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑29, as there is no clearly identified Origami Finance dashboard on major aggregators under the slug origami-finance and Dune MCP is unavailable. ### 2. Yield sources & risk profile
  • Yield is primarily organic from:
  • Lending/borrowing spreads and trading fees on underlying money markets/DEXes.
  • Staking rewards or restaking‑related yields for LSD‑type assets.
  • Some vaults have historically received subsidized incentives (points or tokens) from integrated protocols, meaning part of the APY is non‑recurring and dependent on third‑party programs.
  • Strategies are not strictly market‑neutral: use of LSDs, restaking, or LP positions introduces directional exposure to underlying tokens, and in leveraged structures also to funding/liquidation dynamics. Exact leverage/looping parameters per product are Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑29. ### 3. Lock‑ups, withdrawals, gates
  • Products generally behave like vaults with:
  • Continuous deposits / withdrawals subject to liquidity and any exit queues of the underlying protocols.
  • No hard fixed‑term lock, but soft lock‑ups if underlying assets are staked, restaked, or locked in lending loops.
  • Detailed withdrawal mechanics, gates, or emergency pause conditions per vault are Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑29. ### 4. Fees & protocol revenue
  • Typical structure (from docs and comparable vault protocols):
  • Management fee on TVL (annualized, taken continuously).
  • Optional performance fee on yield above benchmark.
  • How much of these fees accrue to a treasury vs. strategists vs. integrators is Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑29. ### 5. Collateral, TVL, APY
  • Independent platforms do not show a consistent Origami Finance / origami-finance TVL series across Ethereum, Berachain, Plasma; TVL by product/chain, and its trend vs. Dune Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑29.
  • APY history and volatility are only visible at the vault‑UI level and lack third‑party time‑series tracking; sustainability assessment is therefore mostly qualitative: strategies relying on organic trading / lending yields are more sustainable; those heavily dependent on incentives are structurally transient. Given these gaps, the main economic risk flags are: dependence on third‑party protocols and incentives, directional exposure via LSDs and leverage, and limited independent transparency on TVL, fees, and historical APYs.
Evidence (1)

reserves

two sources

Origami Finance’s on-chain reserves/treasury size, treasury addresses, custody structure, reserve policy, attestations, and Dune-verified balances are not verifiable from the provided sources. The only directly relevant reserve language in the results says ovTokens represent a user’s share of the “then-current outstanding reserve” in a vault and that the vault reserve grows as yield is compounded, which describes vault reserves, not a protocol treasury. What is verifiable from the search results is that the protocol’s publicly reported TVL is inconsistent across sources: DeFiLlama shows $49.87m total TVL split across Ethereum, Berachain, and Plasma, while the protocol website claims $117M+ TVL and says those figures reflect on-chain data as of early 2026. That discrepancy should be treated as a contradiction, but it does not establish a treasury balance or reserve composition. For custody and control, no retrieved source identifies treasury multisig addresses, reserve controller roles, signers, or a reserve policy document; therefore these items are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. Likewise, no attestation report, proof-of-reserves statement, or on-chain treasury balance table was available in the results, and Dune/on-chain verification was unavailable in this run. If you want, I can next produce a tighter risk note focused only on: (1) contracts/addresses controlling vault assets, (2) chain-by-chain TVL exposure, and (3) any disclosed admin or multisig risk using the same source constraints.

Evidence (3)

tokenomics

two sources

Origami Finance appears to have a native token called ORI (with stORI as staked ORI) and a separate GAMI liquidity-insurance token in its tokenomics docs; those docs describe ORI as a governance, utility, and value-accrual token. However, the protocol’s main public documentation also emphasizes vault/share tokens such as lovTokens, ovTokens, and oTokens, which are product tokens rather than a clear protocol-wide governance asset. Based on the gathered material, the native token is not fully verifiable as of 2026-08-29 because no independently confirmed contract address, total supply, circulating supply, FDV, unlock table, or on-chain distribution data was available in the collected sources. I could not verify the requested on-chain tokenomics items for Ethereum, Berachain, or Plasma: contract address, total vs. circulating supply, market cap/FDV, emissions, unlocks, holder concentration, insider wallets, mint/blacklist/fee-switch controls, or whether announced unlocks actually occurred on-chain. For all of those, the correct status is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. What is supported from the gathered sources:

  • Origami is deployed across Ethereum, Berachain, and Plasma, with Ethereum the dominant TVL chain in the aggregator data.
  • The protocol’s documented token model includes ORI/stORI and GAMI, but the collected material does not prove a live, widely-traded native token contract or its supply metrics.
  • The docs and product pages describe Origami as an automated leveraged-yield protocol using vault share tokens (lovTokens/ovTokens/oTokens) to represent positions, which is a product mechanic rather than proof of a governance token listing. I could not verify DEX liquidity depth, main listings, or market data beyond the presence of a Berachain DEX pool page snippet for an Origami iBGT/WBERA pool; that is insufficient to establish deep liquidity or token listing status.
Evidence (6)

Stress scenarios

stress scenario - bitcoin price falls below $10000

two sources

Origami Finance’s documented risk disclosures indicate that a severe Bitcoin drawdown can stress leveraged vaults through higher borrowing costs, thin liquidity, and rebalance failures, which can push vault share price lower. The protocol specifically warns that high utilization in external lending markets can make interest rates very high, turn the yield spread negative on the leveraged portion, and trigger RebalanceUp unwinds that may reduce share price. It also warns that thin swap liquidity or a depegging can increase price volatility and cause repeated rebalances, and that the automatic rebalance mechanism may not function as expected or at all in such scenarios. For a stress case where Bitcoin falls below $10,000, the direct implication for Origami depends on each vault’s exact collateral, debt token, leverage level, and chain deployment. However, from the published risk notes, the most plausible protocol-level effects are: higher liquidation/rebalance pressure, worse execution from thin liquidity, and potentially negative carry on leveraged positions if borrowing costs spike. Chain-specific exposure for Berachain, Ethereum, and Plasma is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29 because the provided sources do not identify deployed addresses, TVL by chain, or live positions for this protocol. The broader market sources are consistent that $10,000 Bitcoin is a tail-risk stress outcome rather than a base case, usually linked to deep liquidity contraction, forced deleveraging, and confidence shocks.

Evidence (4)

stress scenario - largest collateral depegs 20%,

one source

A 20% depeg of the largest collateral would be a high-severity stress for Origami Finance because its leveraged vaults can face falling share price, forced deleveraging, and in some cases liquidation if collateral trades at a discount or if liquidity becomes thin. However, the protocol-specific loss impact for Origami Finance across Berachain, Ethereum, and Plasma is not verifiable as of 2026-08-29 from the provided sources, because the results do not include on-chain vault balances, chain-by-chain exposure, or current collateral composition. What can be stated from the documentation is that Origami’s lov-Strategy vaults rely on external lending markets, and the protocol explicitly warns that depegging, thin liquidity, and sustained high utilization can cause rebalancing failures or losses to users. The docs also say that deposit/exit fees may be applied during transient depegs, and that severe or extended depeg scenarios may prevent the automated rebalance mechanism from functioning as expected. For a 20% collateral depeg specifically, the likely risk mechanism is: collateral value drops, LTV rises, RebalanceUp/deleveraging may be triggered, and if the external lending venue or swap liquidity is stressed, the vault can realize slippage or liquidation losses. The exact dollar loss, vault-level drawdown, and chain-by-chain exposure remain not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.

Evidence (4)

stress scenario - committed fraud by the DAO or owners

two sources

For a DAO/owner fraud stress scenario, the relevant loss mechanism is not market risk but governance capture, insider misappropriation, or a rug-pull-style drain of treasury or user assets. General DAO-risk literature describes these as plausible failure modes: creators may retain majority control and withdraw assets, insiders may exploit governance to move funds, and deceptive proposals or smart-contract abuse can be used to misappropriate value. For Origami Finance, the available web results confirm only that it is a DeFi protocol focused on leveraging and auto-compounding, but they do not provide verifiable evidence of fraud by the DAO or owners, nor do they identify audited governance controls, treasury custody, or chain-specific exposure on Berachain, Ethereum, or Plasma. Because the on-chain verification step is unavailable in this run, any claim about actual fraud, owner control, treasury access, or historical misconduct is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. What can be said for stress analysis is:

  • Primary loss vector: admin-key abuse, treasury drain, malicious governance proposals, or coordinated insider exit.
  • Impact profile: abrupt and potentially near-total loss of protocol-held assets, user deposits, or incentive reserves if privileged control exists.
  • Cross-chain relevance: if Origami is deployed on multiple chains, fraud impact should be assessed per chain, since exposure can differ materially by deployment and treasury location; this is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. No reliable source in the provided results establishes a fraud event or confirms the extent of owner/DAO control for Origami Finance specifically.
Evidence (2)

stress scenario - primary yield source negative 30d,

two sources

Origami Finance’s documented stress scenario risk is that the yield spread can become negative when external lending-market utilisation stays very high, especially on leveraged positions in its lov-Strategy vaults. The documentation also says this can be compounded by thin liquidity, depegging, and automatic rebalance behavior that may trigger share-price falls or, in some cases, may not function as expected. For the protocol itself, I could only verify Ethereum activity from the provided search results; DefiLlama shows Origami Finance TVL/fees/revenue data on Ethereum, but no verified chain-specific figures for Berachain or Plasma were available in the results. Therefore, exposure by chain is not verifiable as of 2026-08-29 for Berachain and Plasma, and Ethereum appears to be the only source-backed chain in the search results. A practical reading of your “primary yield source negative 30d” stress case is: if the main underlying lending/farm yield stays below the protocol’s cost of leverage for 30 days, Origami’s leveraged yield vaults can experience negative net carry, which the docs explicitly identify as a risk in prolonged high-rate conditions. I cannot verify on-chain losses, vault-level drawdowns, or chain-by-chain TVL impact from the available sources, so those metrics are not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.

Evidence (2)

Governance & Legal

governance

unverified

Origami Finance appears to be TempleDAO-affiliated rather than a fully decentralized DAO: the public repo describes it as a protocol on origami.finance, while the docs show fixed contract addresses but do not provide a governance framework, proposal flow, timelock, signer set, or threshold that would let me verify decentralized control. The protocol’s own library pages discuss a generic Origami Governance Token with transfer locks, but that is product documentation, not evidence of who controls dev, contracts, frontend, or funds, so it remains an unverified marketing claim. I could not verify on-chain voting concentration, top holders, timelock ownership, multisig signers/threshold, or chain-by-chain TVL/control splits because those require raw on-chain analysis; as of 2026-08-29 they are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. The same applies to any claim that the DAO is “real” versus symbolic: based on the available sources, that governance structure is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. I also could not verify a company-controlled structure, legal entity, jurisdiction, registration number, directors, or terms of service from the gathered sources; these are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. The only concrete non-protocol source found here is the TempleDAO GitHub repository that references Origami Finance, which suggests project lineage but does not establish legal control or authority over contracts/funds.

Evidence (3)

Stability

stability

two sources

The provided sources do not identify which stablecoin Origami Finance used on Berachain, Ethereum, and Plasma, so the depeg history for *the protocol’s actual stablecoin exposure* is not verifiable as of 2026-08-29. The only directly relevant source in the set is Origami’s public documentation repository, but the search results do not include a stablecoin list, treasury composition, or vault/collateral breakdown that would let me match a specific asset to the protocol. If you mean a common stablecoin used in DeFi generally, the best-documented historical depegs in the results are USDC in March 2023, USDT in May 2022, and several later 2025 events for other stablecoins; however, I cannot attribute any of those to Origami without a verified protocol asset list. So the direct answer is: not verifiable as of 2026-08-29 — I cannot confirm whether Origami’s stablecoin ever depegged, how many times, when the last depeg occurred, or the % move, from the available evidence.

Evidence (9)

Risks & Strengths

risks

one source

Top 5 risks for Origami Finance are: 1) Smart contract risk — coding errors, immutable deployed logic, and oracle dependence can cause loss of funds. 2) Liquidation risk — leveraged vaults can suffer partial or full liquidation during black-swan events, oracle failures, de-pegs, or adverse changes in collateral value. 3) Interest-rate / liquidity risk — if external lending markets become highly utilized or illiquid, borrowing costs can rise, spreads can turn negative, and automatic rebalancing may fail or worsen share-price performance. 4) Third-party protocol dependence — Origami’s leverage and vault mechanics rely on external venues such as Spark and Morpho; pauses, parameter changes, or exploits there can strand or damage positions. 5) Market volatility / automated-leverage risk — sharp price moves can outpace automated deleveraging, amplifying losses relative to non-leveraged positions. For the requested chains (Berachain, Ethereum, Plasma), chain-specific exposure is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29 from the provided sources, so I cannot rank these risks by chain without on-chain verification.

Evidence (5)

strengths

two sources

Origami Finance’s top strengths are: automated leverage management, which lets users open and maintain leveraged yield positions with minimal manual oversight; capital efficiency, because it automates looping to amplify exposure without requiring constant health-factor monitoring; deep liquidity access through integration with third-party lenders such as Morpho and Spark; user simplicity, since the protocol is designed as a one-click, low-friction interface for complex DeFi strategies; and broad strategy/asset support, including leveraged yield-bearing token vaults and multi-chain deployment claims across Ethereum and Berachain. These strengths are consistently described in independent analyses and the protocol documentation, with the strongest recurring theme being automated, user-friendly leveraged yield execution.

Evidence (5)

Methodology & Limitations

  • On-chain metrics: not verifiable — Dune phase 2 is not enabled.
  • 4 of 24 fact categories not yet collected.
  • Fact verifiability: 16 two independent sources, 7 one source, 2 unverified.
  • Oldest fact verification date: 2026-08-29.