Suilend

Protocol identification

• Name: Suilend.
• Website / UI: suilend.fi.
• Docs: Hosted at docs.suilend.fi (index file llms.txt and Markdown docs referenced in the docs site).
• Category: Non‑custodial, over‑collateralized lending and borrowing money market on Sui, extended into a broader DeFi suite (lending, leverage, liquid staking via SpringSui, superfluid AMM via STEAMM).
• Launch date: Mainnet launch on Sui in March 2024.
• Chains: Sui only as of the latest information; it is described as Sui’s leading/largest lending protocol.
• Native token: SEND – the protocol’s native token, launched via an “mdrop” points‑based distribution in December 2024.
• Main contract addresses & explorer status:
• Exact Sui object IDs / package addresses for Suilend’s core contracts are Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28 under the current constraints (no on‑chain / explorer lookup possible this turn).
• GitHub repos describe a LendingMarket, Reserves, Obligations, and CTokens as core Move modules on Sui, but they do not themselves provide authoritative deployed addresses.
• Explorer verification status for deployed Suilend contracts is Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28. Fork lineage and design origin
• Suilend is explicitly described as built by the team behind Solend/Save on Solana, and as their first expansion off Solana.
• The public GitHub codebase is a money market on the Sui blockchain written in Move, with architecture analogous to Solend/Compound‑style pools: one Reserve per asset, CTokens for deposits, Obligation objects for positions, dynamic interest rates, oracle‑driven liquidations.
• This indicates conceptual lineage from Solend/Compound‑style pooled lending, but not a direct byte‑for‑byte fork of an EVM protocol; it is a Move re‑implementation adapted to Sui’s object model. Changes vs. upstream & audits
• Documented changes vs. Solend include:
• Use of Sui’s object‑based model (Obligation NFTs, LendingMarket objects) and Move language.
• Integration with SpringSui for liquid staking and STEAMM for superfluid AMM in a unified suite.
• Multiple sources state that Suilend is open‑source and has two independent audits available, without naming auditors or detailing scope.
• Precise audit reports, auditors, and coverage are Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28 given the current tool limits. Malicious‑modification / fork‑risk history
• No credible records were found of malicious modifications in Suilend itself or in closely related forks on Sui in the available web data.
• Absence of evidence is not proof of safety; under the current constraints detailed exploit history is Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28.

Suilend appears to be a real, functional product portal rather than a pure landing page: its documentation includes active SDK references for deposit, withdraw, and other lending operations, which is consistent with a live app ecosystem. The site also has a dedicated docs portal and an API-style SDK reference, so an open developer interface is documented. What is verifiable here is limited to documentation-level evidence; I could not independently confirm live deposits/withdrawals or test the production UI in this turn, so those runtime claims are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28. I also could not verify broken links, fake metrics, or template signs from a hands-on crawl, so those are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28. On the open API question, the docs explicitly expose SDK methods such as depositLiquidityAndGetCTokens, withdraw, and withdrawAndSendToUser, which indicates an accessible programmatic integration surface.

Suilend audit report for the Suilend protocol.

Suilend audit report for the Suilend protocol.

Suilend does appear to have an active bug bounty program focused on its smart contracts (not UI bugs). The current program page says it covers thefts and freezing of funds, pays in vesting SEND on Sui, and is anonymous-friendly with no KYC required. It does not provide a launch date on the page itself, so the start date is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28. Parameters:

• Scope: Suilend smart contracts only; UI bugs are excluded.
• Critical severity: up to 10% of value at risk, capped at $250,000 USD.
• High severity: $50,000 USD.
• Medium severity: $10,000 USD.
• Submission requirements: Critical and High reports must include a proof of concept.
• Payment: in vesting SEND on Sui; no KYC required.
• Excluded: attacks already exploited by the reporter and other out-of-scope issues listed in the policy. Results / outcomes: the program page does not publish public metrics such as total submissions, accepted reports, or paid rewards, so the results are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28 from the available sources. A third-party directory only mirrors the payout tiers and does not add outcome data. One related Suilend document says the protocol has had its smart contracts live on mainnet “since 2024,” which provides context for when a bounty program may have been introduced, but it is not a confirmed start date for the bounty itself.

Suilend is organized as a non-custodial lending protocol: users connect their own Sui-compatible wallet, and deposits move directly into protocol smart contracts rather than to an intermediary custodian. The protocol materials and third-party explainers say Suilend does not hold user keys or funds, so custody stays with the user’s wallet and is enforced by on-chain contracts. Operationally, user assets are placed into reserve contracts for each token, and borrowers/depositors are tracked through on-chain positions such as CTokens and Obligation objects, which represent ownership and borrowing status within the lending market. In other words, Suilend organizes custody as smart-contract control of pooled reserves, while users retain wallet control over signing and can withdraw according to the protocol rules. For risk management, Suilend separates assets into main and isolated pools, so riskier markets are ring-fenced from the core markets; this is a custody/risk-segregation design, not a third-party custody model. Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28: whether any specific administrative key, pause mechanism, or upgrade control can affect withdrawals, because that requires contract-level verification not available in the provided sources.

No confirmed protocol-level exploit, oracle attack, governance attack, key compromise, or depeg event was identified in the provided sources. The clearest reported operational incident was a front-end outage caused by a third-party hosting/custody service provider issue; Suilend said funds were safe and the problem was being investigated and resolved.

A March 2026 liquidity/market-imbalance event on the IKA market was reported as a $379,000 gap after IKA price surged and some loans were liquidated at inflated valuations. Suilend reportedly paused IKA lending, and losses were borne by IKA depositors via an approximately 6% principal reduction; the source set does not provide an independent primary confirmation of reimbursement or a detailed technical fix.

A later update stated Suilend said all functions were operating normally while it monitored a prior Volo Protocol security incident and that user funds were safe. The provided sources do not verify any direct loss at Suilend from that incident, nor any reimbursement action or code fix attributable to Suilend itself.

Suilend’s documentation does not publicly describe a dedicated key-management or custody architecture for protocol operators, so the organization of key management is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28 from the available sources. What can be verified is that Suilend exposes an SDK with an administrative operations interface and example code that uses an Ed25519 admin keypair for admin actions, which implies privileged functions are controlled by signing keys rather than a published on-chain key-management policy. The docs also show that some integration actions are admin-gated and “only Suilend can toggle,” but they do not explain whether keys are held by multisig, an MPC setup, hardware wallets, or a specific internal governance process. Separately, Sui itself supports flexible account/authentication schemes, including heterogeneous multi-signature setups, but that is a chain capability, not evidence that Suilend uses a particular scheme.

Suilend is a lending protocol on Sui, but due to missing on‑chain tooling and limited public technical docs, most smart contract/admin‑risk details are Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28. ### 1. Contract addresses & verification

• Public sources (DefiLlama, explorers, media) identify Suilend as a Sui-native Compound‑style lending market, but do not provide a canonical list of core contract addresses (controller, pools, oracle adapters).
• Sui explorer supports contract verification, yet Suilend’s main contracts are not clearly catalogued or linked from independent sources.
• Status: Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28 (no cross-checked list of addresses; no confirmation of verification/metadata). ### 2. Upgradeability / proxy architecture
• For Ethereum-style DeFi, proxies and upgrade admins are documented on explorers; on Sui, this relies on Move module upgrade governance. Public write‑ups on Suilend do not describe its upgrade pattern, proxy usage, or module upgrade policy.
• No independent description of whether upgrades require DAO voting, multisig approval, or are fully admin‑controlled.
• Status: Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28. ### 3. Admin / owner / emergency roles
• Available listings (DefiLlama, project trackers) mention Suilend as a normal lending market with liquidation and interest‑rate logic similar to Compound/Aave but do not document specific admin roles: pause guardian, reserve manager, oracle admin, or risk council.
• No independent evidence of:
• Pause/guardian powers.
• Emergency withdrawal or forced liquidation functions.
• Fee‑setting or interest‑rate parameter controls.
• Oracle configuration authority.
• Status: Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28. ### 4. Timelocks, role renounce, user exit
• No verifiable on‑chain timelock contract or formal delay for upgrades/parameter changes.
• No evidence that admin roles are renounced or that a DAO has binding control.
• Whether users can always repay and withdraw purely via market logic without admin intervention is not documented by independent technical sources.
• Status: Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28. ### 5. Risk interpretation (conceptual, not on‑chain verified) Given the absence of:
• Audits focused on admin/upgrade controls.
• Published role/timelock schema. Institutional risk stance should assume concentrated upgrade and parameter control risk until proven otherwise: worst case, compromised or malicious keys could change interest rates, oracles, collateral factors, or pause markets, leading to forced liquidations, frozen withdrawals, or value extraction. This is analytical inference, not on‑chain verified evidence.

Suilend is a lending protocol on Sui built by the same broader ecosystem behind Solend on Solana, but available public information on the *specific* individuals and legal entities behind Suilend is thin and fragmented. Below is what is verifiable as of 2026-08-28. 1. Founders and public team status

• Suilend is consistently described as a spin‑off / port of Solend’s model to Sui, and often grouped with Solend under the same ecosystem branding.
• Solend itself is publicly associated with a pseudonymous founder “Rooter” and an engineering/operations team that has historically operated semi‑anon, with limited KYC-style disclosure.
• I was not able to find a Suilend‑specific “team” page, named founders, or doxxed executives on the official site, docs, or major third‑party profiles. Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28.
• There is no confirmed LinkedIn‑style corporate profile or clearly identified legal entity branded explicitly as “Suilend”. Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28. 2. Track record / prior projects and incidents
• The closest antecedent is Solend, a lending protocol launched on Solana in 2021 that has survived major Solana market drawdowns and continued to operate.
• Solend’s most notable negative event was the controversial 2022 governance vote to temporarily take over a large whale account to manage liquidation risk; this was a governance/UX controversy rather than a smart‑contract exploit.
• I did not find records of Suilend itself suffering a major on‑chain exploit or hack reported by independent media or incident trackers. Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28. 3. Public vs anonymous; credibility
• Given the lack of doxxed Suilend‑specific founders and the Solend ecosystem’s history of partial pseudonymity, Suilend should be treated as effectively pseudonymous / anon‑run from a traditional institutional risk perspective.
• Credibility therefore rests more on technical track record, audits, and battle‑testing than on personal reputation or regulated corporate structure. I did not find a clearly labeled, independent Suilend audit report on a major auditor’s site within the search budget. Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28. 4. Jurisdiction, office, and business reality check
• No public information was found confirming:
• a registered legal entity specifically for Suilend,
• a physical office address, or
• explicit onshore vs offshore jurisdiction disclosures. Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28.
• Suilend currently presents as a web‑front, DeFi‑native protocol with unclear corporate backing, typical of many 2021–2024 DeFi projects. From an institutional standpoint this implies: limited recourse, unclear regulatory perimeter, and reliance on technical due diligence rather than corporate covenants. Key institutional takeaway: treat Suilend as a pseudonymous, DeFi‑native extension of the Solend ecosystem with no verifiable formal corporate footprint or doxxed founding team, and structure risk controls accordingly (caps, permissions, counterparty classifications).

Suilend currently has a moderately positive, institution-friendly reputation, backed by recognisable investors and formal verification, but with some residual governance concerns inherited from the Solend/Save history. No public fraud, rug, insolvency, or regulatory actions are reported as of 2026‑08‑28. Founders & team

• Built by the Save/Solend team on Solana, led by the pseudonymous founder “Rooter”, who is widely cited as the driving force behind both Solend and Suilend.
• Commentary highlights a 15‑person team, including 11 developers with TradFi/tech backgrounds (Morgan Stanley, Bell Labs, IBM), which supports perceived technical competency rather than anon-degen origins.
• Reputation is affected by the 2022 Solend whale-account governance episode, referenced as a “hard lesson” in emergency powers and risk management; this is noted as part of Suilend’s legitimacy assessment. Investors & backing
• Suilend has raised $6m across two rounds (US$2m in Feb 2024 and US$4m in Dec 2024).
• The latest round was led by Robot Ventures, with participation from Delphi Ventures, Mechanism Capital, Alliance DAO, Big Brain Holdings, Figment, Karatage, Comma3 Ventures, Quantstamp, and prominent angels such as Balaji Srinivasan, DCF GOD, Mert Mumtaz, among others.
• This investor set is broadly regarded as credible, crypto‑native VC and angel capital, which is a strong positive reputational signal for institutions. Audits, formal verification & security posture
• Certora lists Suilend as having formal verification plus security audit for both its lending and liquid staking protocols on Sui (Mar 2026), positioning it as “the most comprehensive FV on Sui” for these products.
• Multiple sources state Suilend is fully open-source and has two independent audits available to the public, emphasizing transparency and risk documentation.
• A third‑party rating site assigns BB‑grade solvency and legitimacy, with audit coverage seen as the weakest dimension and governance still “nominal”, but no caps triggered and no major red flags. Sentiment, criticisms, and incidents
• Coverage from CoinDesk/Yahoo Finance and major exchanges’ educational content is neutral‑to‑positive, focusing on growth, funding, and technical design; there are no reported hacks, insolvencies, or protocol‑level loss events for Suilend on Sui as of the most recent articles.
• Criticisms center on governance and emergency powers, largely referencing the Solend whale incident rather than any Suilend‑specific abuse. Legal / regulatory / sanctions
• No evidence of regulatory enforcement, sanctions listings, or formal fraud/rug accusations against Suilend, Rooter, or named investors was found in the reviewed materials as of 2026‑08‑28. Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28 beyond these public sources. Unresolved concerns for institutional risk
• Pseudonymous founder and relatively immature governance (BB legitimacy, “nominal governance”) remain structural concerns for institutions.
• On-chain behavior, real voting history, and concentration of control rights on Sui cannot be verified here; any exposure decision should incorporate an independent technical and governance review. Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑28.

Suilend is a money-market / lending protocol on Sui, broadly similar to Solend on Solana (same team), offering overcollateralized lending/borrowing with standard DeFi money-market economics. As-of discipline / on-chain data

• Dune MCP is unavailable; raw on-chain figures (TVL, revenue, APYs, user counts) are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28.
• All quantitative metrics below are from analytics platforms and are not on-chain verified. Strategy & assets
• Core model: users supply assets to earn interest and can borrow against collateral within risk limits.
• Supported assets on Sui include SUI, stablecoins (e.g., USDC on Sui), and other major Sui ecosystem tokens; exact list and weights are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28. Yield sources: organic vs subsidized
• Base yield comes from variable-rate interest paid by borrowers to suppliers (utilization-based interest rate curves).
• There have been liquidity incentives / token rewards referenced in ecosystem discussions, implying at least some subsidized yield on top of organic interest, but exact programs and magnitudes are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28.
• No evidence of restaking yield or external validator income as a primary source. Risk profile: market-neutral vs directional, leverage
• Supplying only stablecoins and not borrowing is relatively market-neutral; borrowing volatile assets or using looping (borrow against supplied collateral to resupply) introduces directional and leverage risk.
• Like other money markets, users can construct leveraged long/short positions via borrowing and re-supplying; no explicit built-in leverage product beyond this. Lock-ups, withdrawals, mechanics
• Deposits are typically fully liquid: users can withdraw at any time subject to pool liquidity (no fixed lock-ups advertised).
• Withdrawals may be constrained during high utilization if most liquidity is borrowed. Fees, gates, limits, protocol revenue
• Protocol revenue is primarily interest spread / share of borrower interest routed to the protocol/treasury or risk/reserve fund.
• Additional fees (liquidation penalties, borrow origination, or withdrawal fees) are common in comparable designs but specific fee schedules for Suilend are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28. Collateral, risk parameters
• Borrowing is overcollateralized, with token-specific LTVs, liquidation thresholds, and caps; details are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28. TVL, APY history, trend
• DeFiLlama lists Suilend as a Sui money market with nontrivial TVL (exact figure and trend Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28).
• APYs are variable, driven by utilization and any incentive programs, and likely volatile in early-stage Sui markets; precise historical APY paths and volatility are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28. Contradiction box
• Any TVL or APY numbers claimed in Suilend’s own UI/docs vs DeFiLlama or other aggregators cannot be reconciled on-chain in this run and must be treated as unverified marketing claims unless independently checked later.

Suilend is a non-custodial lending protocol on Sui, so there is no protocol-owned treasury or reserve pool that users deposit into; instead, each supported asset has its own Reserve inside a LendingMarket object, and users receive cTokens representing their claim on deposited assets. The repository documentation says a LendingMarket holds many Reserves and each reserve corresponds to one token type, while deposits and borrows change reserve balances. The protocol docs do not disclose a treasury wallet, reserve multisig, custody arrangement, or reserve-policy attestation for protocol-owned funds; Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28. For balance context, the live Suilend app shows market-level TVL and per-asset deposits/borrows on Sui, but those figures are protocol operating metrics rather than a treasury balance sheet: total deposits are $145.90m, total borrows are $28.81m, and TVL is $117.33m. The visible reserves on the app include SUI, USDC, USDT, ETH, SOL, and AUSD, which indicates the reserve composition is multi-asset and chain-local to Sui. However, on-chain balances via Dune are not verifiable as of 2026-08-28 because Dune MCP is unavailable in this run, and I cannot confirm reserve addresses, custody control, or treasury composition from raw chain data.[special instruction] Tokenomics sources mention a SEND supply allocation and describe Suilend as fully non-custodial, but they do not establish a protocol treasury reserve or attested treasury policy.

If Bitcoin fell below $10,000, the main risk to Suilend would be a broader crypto risk-off shock that can compress collateral values, reduce borrowing demand, and stress liquidation capacity; however, the specific impact on Suilend cannot be verified from the available sources. Suilend’s own risk documentation says liquidations can fail to fully cover debt in market turmoil, creating bad debts, and that withdrawal/borrow failures can occur when an asset is fully utilized. What can be stated with confidence is narrower: Suilend relies on Pyth and Switchboard price feeds for liquidations, uses over-collateralized lending, and can generate bad debt if liquidated collateral is insufficient. Those mechanisms imply that a sharp BTC drawdown could matter most where BTC-related assets or correlated collateral are used, but the protocol-specific exposure to BTC-backed collateral, BTC borrow demand, reserve buffers, and current pool utilization are not verifiable as of 2026-08-28. A web search also surfaced a third-party risk page that claims Suilend could face cascading liquidations during sharp price moves, especially in thin-liquidity conditions, but this is not on-chain verified and should be treated as an external opinion rather than a confirmed stress test result. Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28: Suilend’s current TVL, BTC-linked collateral share, BTC borrow exposure, bad-debt absorption capacity, and chain-level liquidation resilience under a BTC move below $10,000.

For a 20% depeg of the largest collateral, Suilend’s main risk is a liquidation cascade: borrowers using that collateral would be pushed toward liquidation thresholds, liquidators would take the collateral at a discount, and if market depth is thin, the sale could worsen the depeg and create bad debt. Suilend’s docs say liquidators repay 20% of a borrower’s loan per liquidation action and receive a 5% bounty, which means a depeg shock can propagate through repeated partial liquidations rather than a single full closeout. The exact loss severity is not verifiable as of 2026-08-28 because the current collateral composition, largest-collateral share, and live pool parameters were not verifiable from the available sources. The available risk write-up flags sSUI as widely used collateral and explicitly identifies SpringSui / sSUI depeg risk as a correlated-exposure failure mode, but it does not provide a quantified stress loss for a 20% depeg. Practically, the stress outcome depends on three missing inputs: how much of total borrow exposure is secured by the depegged collateral, how much liquidation liquidity exists on Sui markets at the time, and whether liquidators stay profitable after slippage and the liquidation penalty. If the largest collateral is a major share of lending collateral, a 20% depeg could produce clustered liquidations, temporarily trap deposits, and leave any residual undercollateralized positions as bad debt. So the concise risk view is: material liquidation risk, but unquantified loss severity with current evidence; the protocol’s own liquidation design reduces some tail risk, but thin liquidity and correlated sSUI exposure can turn a 20% collateral depeg into an ecosystem-wide stress event.

I could not verify a committed fraud by the DAO or owners for Suilend from the available sources. The strongest directly relevant source is Suilend’s own docs, which disclose smart-contract and governance-fund loss risks and a bug bounty focused on preventing theft or freezing of funds, but that is not evidence of fraud. The search results also include a social-media allegation that Suilend “decided to ‘recover’ its own losses by subtracting tokens directly from depositors” after an IKA price spike, and that only IKA depositors were affected. However, this is an allegation from an X post, not an independently verified finding, so it is insufficient to establish fraud. There is no independent audit, regulator, court filing, or investigative report in the provided results confirming that the DAO or owners committed fraud. Accordingly, the status is: Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28.

Suilend’s primary yield source is not verifiable as negative in the last 30 days from the available web results. The protocol describes standard lending yield as coming from borrowers’ interest payments on the same pool, minus a protocol spread, and says this yield is “real yield” from onchain borrowing activity on Sui. For Suilend Strategies, the yield source is strategy-specific and may include SUI/sSUI/STRAT rewards plus staking yield, but the source still depends on the specific strategy rather than a single universal yield engine. For a stress scenario, the best-supported interpretation is that a negative 30-day yield would require a sustained shock in the underlying revenue driver(s) for the relevant strategy or lending market, but Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28 whether Suilend experienced such a negative 30-day primary yield on Sui. The search results do not provide the necessary live APY history, pool-level revenue, or chain-level data to confirm a negative 30-day period. If you want the strict stress answer in one line: negative 30d primary yield = Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28.

Suilend’s governance today appears founder/company-controlled, with no evidence of a functioning, independent DAO and limited transparency on contract control. All on-chain specifics are Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28. ## Governance structure & control

• Origins / team linkage: Suilend is presented as a Sui-based adaptation of Solend (Solana money market), and ecosystem references consistently treat it as part of the Solend/Suilend product family.
• DAO vs company: There is no publicly documented Suilend-specific DAO, forum, or governance portal. Governance for Solend exists via SLND and a Realms-based system, but there is no clear statement that Suilend on Sui is governed by the same token or process. Therefore, Suilend’s governance is best characterized as founder-led with no proven token-holder control.
• Contracts & upgrades: No independent audits or explorer documentation clearly describing Suilend’s admin roles, upgrade authority, or timelocks on Sui were found. Admin/upgradability status is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28. ## Multisig, timelock, and powers
• Multisig / signers / threshold: No reliable source details a Sui-based multisig or signer set specifically for Suilend, nor a disclosed threshold (e.g., 2/3 or 3/5). Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28.
• Timelock: No evidence of timelock contracts or documented upgrade delays for Suilend on Sui. Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28.
• Scope of control: Given absence of DAO tooling and lack of timelock/multisig disclosure, it is reasonable to infer that core developers or a small company team likely control upgrades, risk parameters, and pausing powers, but this remains an inference, not an on-chain verified fact. ## Token, voting, and holders
• Governance token: Suilend does not clearly advertise a separate governance token; most references focus on it as a lending market, not a token-governed protocol.
• Voting concentration / top holders: Requires Dune or explorer-based holder analysis, which is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28. ## Legal entity & ToS
• No terms of service, company name, jurisdiction, registration number, directors list, or compliance disclosures specific to Suilend were located on the app site or linked documentation.
• In the absence of such data, governance is opaque, with users lacking clarity on responsible legal entities or recourse. Overall, Suilend on Sui currently operates with non-transparent, likely centralized operational control, no demonstrable DAO, and missing public information on multisig, timelock, and legal entity.

Yes — if the question refers to the token Suilend (SLND) shown in the results, it has depegged at least once. CoinGecko historical data shows SLND closing at $0.582583 on 2025-05-07, which is about 41.7% below a $1 peg, and it remained below $1 for multiple days afterward. The latest depeg visible in the provided data was on 2025-05-23, when SLND closed at $0.647785 (about 35.2% below peg). The exact total number of depeg episodes is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-28 from the provided sources, because they show price history but not a complete event classification.

The top 5 risks for Suilend are: smart contract risk, 100% utilization risk, oracle risk, liquidation risk, and untimely liquidation / bad debt risk. Suilend’s own risk documentation explicitly lists these as core protocol risks, and notes that oracle failures, fully utilized markets, collateral value drops, and large-scale liquidations can all impair withdrawals, trigger wrongful liquidations, or leave pools with bad debt.

• Smart contract risk: the contracts could be exploited or permanently freeze funds.
• 100% utilization risk: if all supplied assets are lent out, withdrawals and new borrows can fail until liquidity returns.
• Oracle risk: Suilend relies on Pyth and Switchboard; incorrect price feeds could trigger wrongful liquidations.
• Liquidation risk: under-collateralized positions can be liquidated with penalties when collateral value falls below thresholds.
• Untimely liquidation / bad debt risk: during stress or large liquidations, liquidated assets may not cover loans, creating shortfalls; Suilend says this is managed with isolated pools, deposit limits, and collateralization controls, but uninsured isolated pools can still face a “race to exit” if underwater debt occurs. A secondary external review also flags broader concerns around Sui-chain concentration, thin liquidity during crashes, and correlated exposure to the sSUI liquid staking token, but the five items above are the clearest protocol-defined risks.

Suilend’s top strengths are its market position on Sui, integrated product suite, capital efficiency, risk segmentation, and team credibility. It is described as the largest lending protocol on Sui and the #1 DeFi protocol on the network, which indicates strong product-market fit and ecosystem traction.

• Leading position on Sui: Suilend is described as the largest lending protocol on Sui and as having become the #1 DeFi protocol on the network since launching in March 2024.
• Broad integrated suite: The protocol combines lending, borrowing, leverage, shorting, swapping, liquid staking via SpringSui, and liquidity provision via STEAMM, reducing the need for users to move across separate apps.
• Capital efficiency: The docs and third-party coverage emphasize features like liquid staking and the STEAMM AMM, which are designed to improve liquidity reuse and overall capital efficiency within the Sui ecosystem.
• Risk isolation architecture: Independent coverage highlights main and isolated lending pools, which help contain risk from newer or more volatile assets instead of spreading it across the whole protocol.
• Experienced team: Suilend is built by the team behind Solend, which strengthens credibility because the team has prior lending-protocol experience before launching on Sui.